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Can we trust monopolistic ￿rms as suppliers of vaccines




Using a simple monopoly model, this note analyses the incentives of a vaccine producer.
Since a vaccine tends to eradicate the disease for which it is intended, it also tends to destroy
its own market. This means that monopolistic producers may, in a socially non-optimal way,
be tempted to delay the introduction of vaccines against new infections until the disease has
spread.
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1 Introduction
The world has su⁄ered from outbreaks of pandemics at irregular intervals and during the twen-
tieth century, it has happened three times. The Spanish ￿ u of 1918-19 killed about 40 million
people within one year. Mortality was concentrated to healthy individuals in the age range of
15 to 35. The pandemics of 1957-58 and 1968-69 were milder and caused two and one mil-
lion deaths worldwide, respectively.1 Contrary to the Spanish ￿ u, deaths were concentrated to
people at the end of their lifespan.
During 2004/2005, large parts of Asia experienced unprecedented outbreaks of the avian
in￿ uenza in poultry, caused by the H5N1 virus. This has lead the WHO to conclude that a
pandemic may be imminent. The director-general of the WHO makes the judgement that "the
world moved closer to a (further) pandemic than it has been at any time since 1968" (WHO,
2005). It is not predictable how severe the avian in￿ uenza will be, once it starts spreading from
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1human to human. However, it is of concern that the virus is highly lethal in its present form,
with a mortality rate of around 50 percent.2
Vaccines are the most important medical intervention for preventing in￿ uenza during a
pandemic. The production of vaccine involves a substantial ￿xed cost in terms of research and
development and thereafter a low marginal production cost (DiMasi et al. 1991).3 The market
for vaccine is therefore characterised by a limited number of ￿rms. There are, for instance,
two manufacturers of in￿ uenza vaccine for the U.S. market4 and in several European countries,
there is one manufacturer supplying the market.
This paper points out a problem concerning the economic incentives of vaccine producing
￿rms: they may be biased to delay the sales of vaccines against new infections in a socially
non-optimal way.
Several market failures in the market for vaccine may lead to the under-consumption of
vaccine, as noted by Kremer (2001a). First, there is the positive externality associated with
the reduced disease transmission by a vaccinated person. Second, a limited number of vaccine
producers can lead to monopolistic pricing behaviour, even if this problem is mitigated by the
fact that governments are large buyers of vaccine. There are also market failures a⁄ecting
the research and development of vaccines. The development and production of a new vaccine
typically involves a large initial investment in R&D and production capability, and thereafter a
relatively low marginal cost of production. Possibilities to design around vaccine patents may
make it di¢ cult to recoup the initial investments. Governments, which are large purchasers
of vaccine, may also be tempted to use their regulatory power to obtain vaccine at a low cost
(Kremer 2001a). Nadiri (1993) and Mans￿eld et al. (1977) estimate the social return to the
development of a vaccine to be twice the private return, whereas Kremer (2001a) estimates that
the return may be ten to twenty times for e.g. a vaccine against malaria.
Kremer and Snyder (2003) make the point that producers may prefer to develop drug treat-
ments instead of vaccines, since a vaccine reduces or stops the spread of a disease, and it is not
possible to extract rents for a vaccine from the yet unborn. In contrast, a drug does not prevent
the spread of the disease, which means that each coming generation will require the drug.
Geo⁄ard and Philipson (1997) show how it is di¢ cult to eradicate a disease in steady-state
by vaccination since once a large fraction of the population has been vaccinated, the demand
for vaccine falls in the remaining population. This tends to make it unpro￿table for ￿rms to
continue supplying vaccines and it likewise makes it di¢ cult for the government to achieve
vaccination of the whole population through vaccine subsidies.
This note analyses the pro￿t maximising choices of a monopoly producer of a new vaccine.
2The cumulative number of con￿rmed human cases of avian in￿ uenza A/(H5N1) according to WHO since 28
January 2004 to date (January 2006) is 160. The mortality among those 160 is 85 cases. In almost all cases, the
infection has spread from animals to humans.
3The marginal production cost of a ￿ u vaccine is actually higher than for many other vaccines, since ￿ u vaccine
is produced in incubated eggs, which are di¢ cult and costly to handle.
4These are Chiron Corporation and Aventis Pasteur.
2The producer sets the price of the vaccine but also decides on the point in time for introducing
it on the market, given that the infection spreads according to a simple law of motion for an
epidemic. The trade-o⁄for the producer is that the willingness of non-infected individuals to pay
for vaccine increases with the number of infected, while the number of individuals demanding
vaccine decreases as more individuals become infected. It is shown that the pro￿t maximising
solution to this problem is far from the socially optimal one. Introducing forward looking agents
does not eliminate the problem of a time-lag for the introduction of a vaccine, unless consumers
have very low, or producers very high, time discount rates. Moreover, forward looking behaviour
greatly increases the monopoly rents.
Naturally, there are many reasons why ￿rms may act less cynically than what is suggested
by this model. There are reputation e⁄ects and competition from potential entrants, but it
is also the case that pharmaceutical ￿rms operate in a government-regulated environment.
Nevertheless, an awareness of the incentives for monopolistic ￿rms to delay the introduction
of vaccines against new infections is important, especially so when the disease in question is
serious. A particularly troubling case is the threatening avian in￿ uenza pandemic.
2 A Simple Model
The constant population, N;consists of infected, It, and susceptible, St, individuals at time t.
Individuals are randomly matched at each point in time, implying the following law of motion




where ￿ is a transmission parameter related to a multitude of epidemiological, environmental
and social factors. Solving this equation using that N = St + It; and normalising N ￿ 1 gives
It =
1
1 +  e￿￿(t￿t0); (2)
where It is the share of the population that is infected, and 1
1+  represents the share infected at
time t0: Figure 1 numerically illustrates the spread of an epidemic for ￿ = 0:1 and   = 100000:
Initially, the disease spreads slowly but it accelerates sharply when a su¢ ciently large share of
the population is infected. Finally, when almost everyone is infected, the spread of the infection
slows down sharply.
Agents understand the dynamics of the infection given by (2), and they discount time by
￿: Individuals are randomly matched, and the probability of being infected at a point in time,
5A couple of simpli￿cations are employed here: Since our interest is in a rather rapid epidemic, natural deaths
and births are unimportant compared to stocks and are therefore abstracted away. Second, our setup implies that
everyone eventually becomes infected. This is one of the simplest cases in the literature on epidemics. Adding
a law of motion for recovery greatly complicates the (transitional) dynamics, without altering the qualitative
results of this paper.
3Figure 1: The dynamics of the infection (￿ = 0:1,   = 100000)





There is a linear demand curve for vaccine at time t
Xt = (1 ￿ It)(at ￿ ￿pt); (4)
incorporating that only the non-infected demand vaccine. ￿ is normalised to one in what follows,
without any e⁄ect on the qualitative results. The intercept of the demand curve, at, is assumed
to depend on how harmful the infection is, h, and the integral of future hazard rates discounted








1 +  e￿￿s ds: (5)
This integral has no simple analytical solution, and the general case must therefore be handled
by numerical simulation.
The vaccine is supplied by a monopolist that, at time t0; has sunk the ￿xed cost F to possess
the knowledge and production capacity to quickly supply vaccine at a marginal cost of c. His
pro￿t function is given by
6The notion that the demand for vaccine increases with the perceived risk of being infected is supported by
empirical evidence by e.g. Philipson (1996) who uses U.S. data to show how demand for vaccine against measles
is prevalence elastic.
4￿t = pXt ￿ cXt ￿ F: (6)






The monopolist chooses the price, but also the time for introducing the vaccine. The latter
choice is non-trivial. The longer the ￿rm waits, the higher the share of infected, It; and con-
sequently, the higher is the willingness of the uninfected to pay. However, the larger is It, the
smaller is the market for vaccine. Moreover, the ￿rm discounts time at rate r. At t0, the ￿rm
￿nds the optimal time for introducing the vaccine by maximising the discounted value of future
pro￿t with respect to t :
max
ftg
Vt0;t = (pt ￿ c)(1 ￿ It)(at ￿ pt)e￿r(t￿t0) ￿ F: (8)
Before turning to a numerical solution of this problem, it may be noted that it can be
solved analytically when consumers have static expectations implying that demand is solely






and using this together with (7) gives (8) as
Vt0;t = (1 ￿
1
1 +  e￿￿(t￿t0))
￿
h￿





e￿r(t￿t0) ￿ F: (10)
This expression is plotted in Figure 2 (  = 100000;r = 0:03;c = 0:1;￿ = 0:1;h = 200;￿ =
0:05;F = 1) for some parameter values.
Initially, the infection spreads slowly (c.f. Figure 1), and because of the low demand at these
levels of It, the ￿rm will not be able to recover its costs. The monopolist will, at this stage, not
even be able to cover its variable cost, which means that the best outcome is ￿F; as shown by the
horizontal line in Figure 2.7 However, as the increase in the number of infected accelerates, the
price increase leads to a sharp increase in pro￿t as shown in the ￿gure. Finally, as I approaches
N; the demand for vaccine drops towards zero, with falling pro￿t as a consequence.























From this expression, it can be seen that a higher   means it takes longer before the interior
maximum is reached. This is the case simply because a lower fraction of the population infected












5Figure 2: The value of introducing the vaccine at time t (  = 100000;r = 0:03;c = 0:1;￿ =
0:1;h = 200;￿ = 0:05;F = 1)
at t0 implies a longer time period before the infection takes o⁄. It is also clear from the expression
that F does not a⁄ect the pro￿t maximising point in time to introduce the vaccine. It only a⁄ects
the monopoly pro￿t. For the remaining parameters, comparative static results are unrevealing
and we therefore turn to a numerical investigation of the general case.
Figure 3 (  = 100000;r = 0:03;c = 0:1;￿ = 0:1;h = 200;￿ = 0:05;F = 1) compares
consumers with static expectations and forward looking consumers. Accounting for forward
looking behaviour has two e⁄ects. First, it greatly increases the pro￿t of the monopolist,
compared to the case with myopic consumers. This happens because the consumers￿willingness
to pay increases as they internalise the higher risk of being infected in the future. Second, it
makes it optimal for the producer to introduce the vaccine at an earlier date. However, as
illustrated in the ￿gure, there may still be a signi￿cant time lag before the vaccine is sold.
The reason for this is that the ￿rm waits for the sharp increase in hazard rates seen in
Figure 1, before releasing the vaccine. When the discount rate is lower, future hazard rates are
better internalised by consumers, which implies a higher willingness to pay for vaccine at t0; and
less reason for delaying vaccine sales from the ￿rm￿ s point of view. Figure 4 (  = 100000;r =
0:06;c = 0:1;￿ = 0:1;h = 200;F = 1) shows how the delay in vaccine sales decreases towards
zero with a falling ￿. Clearly, in the limiting case when consumers do not discount time, ￿ = 0,
￿rms will always release the vaccine immediately, as long as the monopolist discounts time.8
8Actually, the discount rate of consumers must be slightly above zero for convergence of the integral that
6Figure 3: The e⁄ect of the time discount rate of consumers ￿ (  = 100000;r = 0:06;c = 0:1;￿ =
0:1;h = 200;F = 1):
7Figure 4: The e⁄ect of the ￿rm￿ s time discount rate r (  = 100000;￿ = 0:03;c = 0:1;￿ =
0:1;h = 200;F = 1):
The e⁄ect of the time discount rate of the ￿rm, r, is similar to but opposite to the e⁄ect of
￿. Figure 5 (  = 100000;￿ = 0:03;c = 0:1;￿ = 0:1;h = 200;F = 1) illustrates the e⁄ect of r on
V0;t. A high discount rate erodes the present value of future returns and therefore pushes the
￿rm towards an early release of the vaccine. One interpretation of r; stepping slightly outside
the model, is that it measures the degree of competition in the vaccine market. A higher degree
of competition implies that it is more likely that a competitor will release a competing vaccine
at any point in time. This makes the producer holding the vaccine more impatient. Figure 5
shows a numerical example of how the time-lag in releasing the vaccine becomes shorter, and
the monopoly pro￿t lower, as the ￿rm￿ s discount rate increases.
Further numerical solution of the model shows that a higher ￿; which implies a faster spread
of the disease, results in a shorter time period before the vaccine is released and increases the
monopoly pro￿t. A higher h increases the monopoly pro￿t, with no e⁄ect on the time lag.
Finally, a higher marginal cost of producing vaccine increases the time lag before introducing
the vaccine. The reason for this is that the ￿rm makes a trade o⁄ between price and volume,
when choosing the pro￿t maximising time to sell the vaccine. A higher marginal production cost
makes a high volume relatively less compelling, and therefore pushes the ￿rm in the direction
of higher price and lower volume.
determines at:
82.1 Price discrimination
The monopolist producer may be able to price discriminate. Consider the case of perfect
price discrimination, which implies that the monopoly pro￿t is (1￿It)(at ￿c)2=2; and that the





(1 ￿ It)(at ￿ c)2e￿r(t￿t0) ￿ F: (12)





(1 ￿ It)(at ￿ c)
2 e￿r(t￿t0) ￿ F: (13)
Thus, perfect price discrimination increases monopoly pro￿ts, but it does not alter the pro￿t
maximising delay in introducing the vaccine t￿.9 The reason for this is that t￿ is chosen to max-
imise the (discounted) area below the demand curve, whereas the degree of price discrimination
only a⁄ects the share of the consumer surplus that can be appropriated by the ￿rm.
2.2 Some welfare considerations
It is clear that, when compared to the counterfactual of a monopoly producer, a social planner
could improve welfare. First, if the monopoly rent su¢ ces to motivate the ￿xed cost of develop-
ing a vaccine the planner, who takes the entire consumer surplus into account, will always want
to incur the development cost. Moreover, if the planner supplies the vaccine, he will always
choose to introduce it at t = 0: Thus, the planner solution is pplan = c; tplan = 0:10
In a case where a monopolist does not develop a vaccine due to very high ￿xed costs, it
is still possible that a planner would choose to do so. First, in contrast to the not perfectly
price discriminating monopolist, the planner takes the entire consumer surplus into account and
second, the harm of the infected enters the planner￿ s calculation.
3 Conclusions
This paper makes a simple point: Vaccine developers and producers may have an incentive to
delay the introduction of a vaccine against a new disease until it has spread, if the willingness to
pay for vaccine by the non-infected individuals increases with the spread of the disease. When
consumers are forward looking, they are more willing to pay for the vaccine at an early date.
However, unless consumers have a very low time discount rate or the vaccine producer a high
time discount rate, it will still be optimal for the producer to delay the sales of vaccine. The
delay will also increase in the marginal production cost of the vaccine.
9It is easily shown that this result also holds when ￿ is not normalised to one.
10Here, I abstract from other externalities, such as reduced disease transmission. Taking this into account
implies that vaccines should be supplied below the marginal cost.
9Naturally, in reality, there are a number of factors limiting this type of behaviour by ￿rms.
Pharmaceutical ￿rms may have important goodwill capital to defend, which could be seriously
a⁄ected if it were revealed that a ￿rm was stalling the introduction of an important vaccine.
Second, delayed sales imply a risk of a competitor entering the market. Finally, the ￿rms operate
in a market where governments are very present as buyers and regulators, which may limit the
scope for socially harmful practises.
Nevertheless, it is important for governments to realise the existence of this incentive prob-
lem. Vaccine production is globally concentrated to relatively few ￿rms and in many countries,
there is virtually only one supplier. The problem noted here also becomes more important when
the disease in question is grave. A case of particular concern is the threatening pandemic in
avian in￿ uenza.
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